MASTERPIECES OF WORLD PHILOSOPHY FROM PAGE 10

DEMOCRITUS: FRAGMENTS: Author: Democritus of Abdera (c. 460-c. 370 B.C.) Type of work: Philosophy of nature. First transcribed: Probably fourth century B.C. Principal Ideas Advanced: a) Since nothing can come from nothing, and change really occurs, and motion requires a void, reality must consist of atoms moving in a void. b) The only inherent properties of atoms are size, shape, and solidity: color, sweetness; bittterness, and other such qualities are attributed to objects because of the sensations occurring within experiencing organisms, but such qualities have no existence in objects. c) The sensations that come from experiencing varios kinds of atoms vary according to the shapes of the atoms. d) Th best form of government is the democratic. e) The wise man is one who limits his ambition according to his ability./ In all probability credit for the fundamental ideas of the atomic theory -Greek speculation´s greatest achievment- should go to Leucippus of Miletus rather than to his pupil Democritus. But we know almost nothing of Leucippus./ Rational speculation about the nature of the world began not earlier than the sixth century B.C. Four or five generations later it had progressed, in Democritus, to an essentially correct account of the nature of matter. This amazing fact has led to both exaggerations and underestimation of the Greek achievement. On the one hand, some people conclude that science stood still until the revival of the atomic theory in the 17th century. On the other, scientists especially are prone to point out that modern atomic physics rests on evidence derived from careful quantitative experimentation of which the Greeks knew nothing: therefore, it is said,the ancient theory was merely a lucky guess- and the Greeksmade all possible guesses. A brief reviewof the development of early Greek physics will show that while Democritus did not have Dalton´s reasons for asserting that the world consists of atoms moving in the void, he nevertheless, had some very good ones. Knowing these, we shall be able to compare ancient and modern atomism less usperficially and misleadingly./ The men of Miletus, especially Anaximander, who made the break with mythological world accounts in the early sixth century B.C. took over from previous creation myths two important assumptions. First, these Milesians accepted the belief that there was a creation, or rather, a development: the world was not always as it is now, but had in the beginning been something simple and homogeneous, like the "chaos" of the myths. Differentiation, complexity, and organization have a history. Second, th Milesians accepted the theory that there exists an impersonal force making for order and "justice" in the universe at large. The Milesians were the first philosophers because they dispensed altogether with the "will of the gods" as an explaantory principle, because they assumed that the natural forces that made the universe what it is were of a kind still operative. The problem, as they conceived it, was to identify the original simple world-stuff, out of which all things had come, and to describe the process which had differentiated and organized it into the present world. Not "divine" inspiration but ordinary human reason, they thought, was capable of solving the problem. And since conclusions based on reasons invite criticism and modification, unlike revelations which can be only accepted or rejected, the history of rational speculation was progressive./ In addition to the ideas of ultimate oneness, development, and "justice" inherited from religion, the earliest philosophers assumed with "common sense" that nothing can come out of nothing, or be absolutely destroyed, and that our senses reveal to us directly the constituents of the world, at least as it is now. We feel heat and cold, we taste sweetness and bitterness; we see red and green. Heat, cold, sweetness, bitterness, red, and green are therefore parts of the objective world; together they make it up. We should say that these are qualtites of matter, but early Greek thought does not make this distinction; "the hot," "the cold," "the wet," "the dry," and so on, in various combinations, are the stuff of things. One must simply find out the unity underlying this diversity./ Thus, for example, Anaximenes, th third of the Milesian "physicists," held that the fundamental stuff is Mist. Everything is really Mist; the things that do not appear to be Mist are Mist that has been thickened or thinned. Very thin Mist is fire; Mist somewhat thickened is water, thickened still more it is stone./ There is an inconsistency here which Parmenides (in effect) pointed out. No doubt the theory of Anaxmenes squares with observation, for fire, when cooled and "thickened," becomes smoke and smoke is easy to regard, at this stage of thought, as a kind of fog or Mist. Condensed Mist is water, and water thickened still more becomes ice, a solid, a kind of stone. But is the theory compatible with logic? Fire is (identical with) "the cold and wet." How, then, can the one be transformed into the other without violating the fundamental principle that nothing can come from nothing? Where did the cold come from? Where has the hot gone? If cold and hot are thought of (so to speak) as substances, it seems that there can be no satisfactory answer to this question. Something has come out of "nothing"; something has disappeared into "nothing." Worse till, as Parmenides saw, if there is ultimately just one stuff, that stuff must be just the kind of stuff it is, so that it cannot logically be both hot and cold, both wet and dry. Therefore change is impossible. If things seem to change (as they do), this must be mere illusion, for logic pronounces it contradictory./ It is important to see that Parmenides was right, given his assumptionsof monism, nothing-from-nothing, and identity of things and qualities. Parmenides had another argument (a fallacious one) to show that the kind of change called motion cannot really occur. It is this: If a thing moves, there must be room for it to move into -that is, there must be empty space. But there cannot be any empty space, for empty space would be just "nothing," "that which is not," and the assertion that there is empty space amounts to saying "That which is not, is," a statement of contradiciton./ The philosophers Empedocles and Anaxagoras tried to devolp systems which would meet the logical objections of Parmenides without flying in the face of common sense. They argued that motion could occur without empty space if the moving thing displaced what was in fornt of it, as a fish swims in water. For the rest, they abandoned monism. Empedocles said that there are six basic stuffs, while Anaxagoras held that there are an infinity -as many stuff as there are sensible discriminations- and aall things are made by the mixture and separation of these stuffs./ The philosophy of Anaxagoras successfully met Parmenides´criticism, but at too high a price. While it is hard to say precisely just what it is that we are asking for when we demand an explanation of something, at any rate it is clear that an explanation is not satisfactory unless in some sense the ideas used in the explanation are simper; or more unified, than the thing to be explained. But if one´s explanatory principles are as diverse as the things to be explained, the requirement cannot be met. "Flour is a mixture in which flour-stuff predominates, and water is a mixture in which water-stuff predominates, and the two make bread because when they are mixed and baked the bread-stuff in both of them comes to the fore." This may be true, but it is too easy, and it does not explain anything. Leucippus and Democritus descovered a better way of answering Parmenides. As to motion, Leucippus flatly declared that "nothing" does exist; while Democritus more appropriately dismissed Parmenides´ quibble with another: "Hing´ exists no more than ´not-hing,´"the point of the joke began that if" ´Nothing does not exist" is a truth of logic, elimiation of the double negative must also produce a logical truth: " Hing´ does exist." But "thing," so far from existing, is not even a word. (Greek for "nothing" is "meden," of which "mé" means "not," while "den" has no meaning in isolation.) / There is, then, a void, and things that move in it. These things are atoms -"uncuttables." Each separate atom is like the "reality" of Parmenides, uncreated, indestructible, unchanging. The matter in an atom is homogeneous, and nothing can happen to one internally; that is, each atom is infinitely hard. Atoms differ from one another in size and shape -that is all. They do not differ in color, for instance, but not because they are all the same color. They do so because they have no color at all (not even black or gray). Similarly for heat, moisture, taste, and odor. Atoms have always been (and always will be) in motion -"like the motes in a sunbeam." They jostle one another, and in their jostlings, two kinds of processes occur that result in the "coming-into-being" of the large-scale aggregates with which we are familiar. One is vortex motion the effect of which is to separate random aggregates according to likenesses, the heavier -that is, the bigger- atoms going to the center, the lighter ones to the periphery. The other process is the hooking on to each other by atoms of like configuration./ One atom can affect another only by colliding with it: and the outcome of a collision (hooking, or change of direction or speed) is determined by the sizes, shapes, and velocities of the atoms involved in the collision. But the sizes and shapes areeternal, and the velocities in their turn are outcomes of previous colisions. Therefore, there is no such ting as "chance" in nature; "Nothing happens at random," Leucippus pronounced in the one sentence of his that has survived, "but everything from a rationale and by necessity." Ideally, explanation should consist in finding out the laws of motion and impact and using these to show how one atomic configuration came about from a previous one. Such a complex act is of course impossible; however, Democritus sought to apply the fundamental idea of mechanical causation to observable phenomena./ There is an ancient story that illustrates his method and points up its difference from traditional concepts. Considerable interest had been aroused by the extraordinary death of a prominent man. When he was strolling along a beach, an eagle had dropped a turtle on his head. Why? It was recalled that an oracle had said that he would die of "a bolt from Zeus." this had been thought to be a prediciton of death by a stroke of lightning. But someone pointed out that the eagle was sacred to Zeus; thus, the oracle was fulfilled. This satisfied most Greeks, but not Democritus. He went to the beach and observed the habits of eagles. He found that they were fond of turtle meat. In order to get at it, an eagle would seize a turtle in his talons, fly into the air with it, and drop it on a rock to crack the shell. This observation, together with the fact that the deceased had been bald, provided an explanation that satisfied Democritus. The curious event was shown to be one item in a natural regularity or pattern. It was unncessary to postulate the purposes of unseen beings to accout for the fact. Aristotle complained, quite unjustifiably, that Democritus "reduced the explanation of nature to the statement, ´Thus it happened formerly also.´" The fact is that Democritus understood the character of scientific explanation far better than did Aristotle./ In sum Democritus´ reason for asserting that reality consists of atoms moving in the void is that this statement can be deduced from the premises: (1) Nothing can come from nothing, (2) change really occurs, and (3) motion requires a void. That explanation must be mechanistic also follows from these assumptions if it is further allowed that all interaction is impact. Democritus´ mechanism was also the culmination of the rejection of animistic and supernatural will-forces by all his philosophical predecessors./ Democritus´ atomism, and still more his mechanism, agree in principle with the fundamental tenets of modern physical science. (By "in principle" it is meant to rule out as inessential, though important, such differences as that the particles of the present-day physicists are wave-packets or whatever , and fuzzy, and hookless; what is essential is the concept of matter as somehow granular, and that physical processesw are analyzable into redistribution of energy among these grains.) What modern physicists have that Democritus lacked is a conception of controlled, quantitative experimentation, together with a technique of mathematical manipulation of the data./ For this reason, Democritus, though he declared that he would "rather discover one casual explanation than gain the kingdom of the Persians," failed utterly to add to detailed knowledge of nature. In fact, he was much behind his own times, still believing, for instance, that the earth is a flat disc, though the Pythagoreans had long understood its sphericity. In detailed explanations, Democritus could do no better than this: "Thunder is produced by an unstable mixture forcing the cloud enclosing it to move downward. Lightning is a clashing together of clouds by which the fire-producing atoms rubbing against each other are assembled through the porous mass into one place and pass out. And the thunderbolt occurs when the motion is forced by the very pure, very uniform and "closely-packed" fire-producing atoms, as he himself calls them." (The foregoing is an ancient paraphrase, not a quotation from Democritus.) It must be admitted that this account is no worse than any other prior to Frandlin, and a considerable improvement over "Zeus is angry."/ "By convention color, by convention sweet, by convention bitter; but in reality atoms and void." Thus Democritus states his theory. The atoms alone are real, and their only inherent qualities (we can use this word now, for Democritus distiguished for the first time clearly between thing and quality) are size, shape, and solidity. Then what about color, sweet, bitter, and the rest? They are "by convention." What does this mean? Democritus held that a man´s soul consists of particularly fine and spherical, hence mobile, atoms. When certain "images" from the external world -the images being, of course, themselves assemblages of atoms- impinge on the soul atoms, a sensation is produced. The sensation occurs only within the ensouled body; hence, is not "out there" because the external world is colorless and odorless. This is a part of the meaning of "by convention," a phrase that might be rendered as "subjective." The sensations are also subjective in the sense that they lead us tu suppose , falsely, that the world is colored and odorous./ "There are two forms of knowledge, one genuine, one obscure. Of the obscure sort are all these: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The genuine is distinguished from this... Whenever the obscure cannot sense any farther into the minute by seeing or hearing or smelling or tasting or touching, but [it is necessary to pursue the investigation] more finely, [then the genuine, which has a finer organ of knowing,] comes up." The organ of "genuine knowledge" would seem to be the "Pure Reason" that led Democritus to deduce the atomic nature of matter. But Democritus was worried, as well he might have been, about the "obscure." He portrayed the senses speaking thus to the mind: "´Wretched mind, getting from us your confidences you cast us down? That is your own downfall.´" For the information on which even the atomic theory is based is, after all, derived ultimately from observation through the senses./ If reality consists of matter with only its "primary qualities," what kind of reality do sensation, and thought, and consciousness in general have? This problem besets all forms of materialism and is often alleged (wrongly) to be fatal to it as a world view. Democritus spent much effort in trying to account for sensations on atomic principles. Thus, he claimed that sour fluids consist of aangular and twisted atoms, while honey is made of rounded, rather large ones. This was, of course, inconsistent with his claim that tastes are subjective effects. He could have patched up the account to some extent by considering not only the atomic constitution of the food but also that of the tongue which interacts with it; but there is no evidence that he did so. Perhaps it was despair at this problem that led him to exlaim, "In reality we know nothing. For truth is in depth." / Materialists should say that sensations are not things at all; but Democritus held that they are illusory things. This, at any rate, is the impression we get from ancient discussions of his theory of knowledge. It may be mistaken, for the accounts all come from hostile critics who may well have misunderstood or misinterpreted the great Abderite./ Unlike most Greek philosophers, Democritus was a partisan of democracy. He said: "Poverty in a democracy is as much prefereable to so-called prosperity in an autocracy as freedom is to slavery." By "democracy" he meant a constitutional government directed by public-spirited, intelligent men in the interest of all citizens./ Democritus was one of the most prolific authors of antiquity, having written, we are told, more than sixty works. All have perished. The fragments that remain fill about ten pages of ordinary print, of which eight are concerned with ethics, politics, education, and child-rearing. (Democritus thought it a risky and thankless business to have children.) Many of the ethical reflections are unbearably platitudinous: "In good fortune it is easy to find a friend, in misfortune hardest of all." Others are shrewd and worldly wise: "If you cannot understand the compliments conclude that you are being flattered." The general tenor of the maxims is advocacy of "cheerfulness," that is, of prudence, contentment with what one has, not worrying too much: "He who would be cheerful must not busy himself with many things, either by himself or in company; and whatever he busies himself with, he should not choose what is beyond his own power and nature. But he should be so on his guard that when a stroke of fortune tempts him to excess, he puts it aside, and does nto grasp at what is beyond his powers. For being well-filled is better than being stuffed." There are some fragments, however, that rise quite above this pedestrian level, embodying, in fact teachings often credited to others, and used unfairly to belabor crude "Materialism": "Refrain from wrongdoing not from fear but from duty." "The doer of injustice is unhappier than the sufferer." "Goodness is not merely in refraining from being unjust, but in not even wishing to be." "The cause of error is ingnorance of the better." / Pertinent Literature: Cleve, Felix M. The Giants of Pre-Sophistic Greek Philosophy: An Attempt to Reconstruct Their Thoughts. The Hague, The Netherlands. - In a fascinating chapter on Leucippus of Miletus and Democritus of Abdera, Felix Cleve has attempted to reconstruc Democritus´ theories through a new analysis of the fragments and by posing a seires of searching questions about interpretations of his positions that had been proposed by his succesors. Cleve concentrates especially upon Democritus´ physical theories and on his theory of sensation, ignoring completely his moral theories and his famous aphorisms. He is particularly careful to avoid confusing the theories of Democritus with those of his famous successor, Epicurus, whom he accuses of having "bowdlerized" and "jumbled up" the true Democritean theory and thereby confused almost everyone for thousands of years./ Atoms are unchangeable ins several important respects, First, they are indivisible, and thus can never become smaller than they are at any given moment. Second, they never alter their shape or their size. Finally, they cannot grow by "adhesion"; that is, particles of similar shape cannot adhere to the smooth sides of one another. They form compounds not by adhesion or what we would call magnetic or gravitational attraction, but by irregularities on their surfaces -hooks and eyes of various sizes and shapes- which fit into similar projections and crevices on the surfaces of other atoms. Thus, by a purely mechanical process, atoms grasp one another as they move throug space, catching more and more until rather large aggregates are formed. Although most atoms are very tiny, some of them are of gigantic size. The word "atom" simply means indivisible, not minute, as we are sometimes inclined to suppose. The gigantic atoms form the nuclei of the stars, according to Democritus./ Epicurus accounted for the conglomeration of atoms in a way that is strangely eminiscent of the modern theory of Werner Heisenberg, sometimes known as the indeterminacy or uncertainty principle. The Heisenberg principle was inspired by the fact that microscopic particles are observed to dart suddenly and unpredictably from their paths.´Epicurus suggested that originally atoms were falling in parallel lines through the void of space, but that every now and then, for no apparent reason, they would suddenly veer out of their downward paths and move into the paths of other atoms. These sudden deviations would frequently result in collisions which would in turn bring about the connection of one atom with another. According to Cleve, this was not the theory adopted by Democritus. Democritus believed that the atoms were moving in every posible direction. Indeed, each atom has a motion peculiar to itself. Since Democritus believed that space is infinite, there was no reason for him to suppose that there is an absolute "up" or "down," so it would have made no sense for him to assume that toms were falling through the void. falling requiring a presupposition of some "downward direction in which the motion is proceeding. Since the atoms proceed in parallel paths, in perpendicular paths, and in paths that criss-cross in every imaginable way, it is inevitable that they will collide with one another and eventually from larger conglomerations./ Why does an atom move? Because it is its nature to do so. It moves not because of gravity or because it is attracted to or repelled by anything else; rather its motion is as much an inherent quality of itself as its shape is. Democritus made no attempt to explain the atom´s motion (an omission for which he was taken to task by Aristotle and others), simply becuse he felt that there was no reason to explain it. It was merely a brute fact. Since the atoms are moving in random directions, each one with its own velocity, and each one in a straight line, it followed, according to Democritus, that space must be infinite. For were it not, the atoms would constantly be crashing into the outer boundaries of space only to bounce off and head in the opposite direction, a conclusion which Democritus evidently felt was absurd./ Moreover, from the infinity of space it follwoed that there must be an infinite number of atoms; for with an infinite amount of space in which to dash about, the atoms would eventually be spread so thin that very little of any consequence would be left after a certain amount of time had passed. And since there is an infinite number of atoms and an infinite amount of space in which they may do whatever they do, there is no reason to suppose that tere is only one world. Therefore, Democritus drew the logical conclusion that there are infinitely many worlds. And since he could see no reason why the atoms should necessarily form similar conglomerations in various parts of the infinite void, he concluded that the infinite worlds could have an infinite number of varieties./ Inasmuch as each of the atoms possesses a natural motion, the question inevitably arises: How can we account for the fact that some objects, at least, are quite stable and seem not to be in motion at all? The answer, it appears, is that even though the aggregate is at rest, each of the particles of which it is composed is nevertheless in constant motion -a theory not very far from that with which we are familiar from modern atomic theory./ The atomists advanced a number of arguments to bolster their theory, the principal ones being: (a) If there were no empty spaces (that is, if the world were a plenum, or if objects were perfectly solid with no empty spaces between their parts), it would be impossible to account for motion. (b) The expansion and contraction of solids is inexplicable except under the theory that they are composed of solid particles separated by empty spaces which are widened during expansion and narrowed during contraction. (c) Organic objects (animals and plants) can grow without merely developing thicker and thicker tissues and without losing their shapes only because some particles separate from one another, making room for others. / Whether these arguments are fully persuasive is another matter. The most persuasive, perhaps, is this: (d) Ashes thrown into a vessel that is full of water will not cause the water to overflow. Nor will soluble salts added to a vessel full of water cause the water to overflow. Therefore (they reasoned), the particles of ashes or salts must be moving into the empty spaces between the particles of water./ The atoms possess size, shape, valocity, and resistance to penetration, according to the atomists, but no color, flavor, smell, or other properties. The atomists also said the the atoms are "apathetic," that is, unfeeling, by which they meant that they are not alive. In this respect, Democritus and his colleagues initiated an important departure from the other early Greek philosophers, who seem to have believed that all matter was in some sense alive./ In order to account for life and consciousness, Democritus assumed that fire atoms carry sensation and will, and that they are the force behind such biological functions as growth, automotion, nutrition, and the like ("automotion" meaning motion which is initiated by an act of will, of course, as distinguished from the purely automatic motions of atoms and inorganic matter). The loss of fire atoms accounts, in turn, for death. Consciousness and sensation are purely bodily functions. For Democritus, there is no immaterial soul or spirit, since only atoms -that is, material particles- and the void exist./ In attempting to explain vision, Democritus´ predecessors -and also some of the great philosophers who came after him, including Plato- imagined that somewhere between the eye and the object being perceived, there is a meeting of two rays, one proceeding from the eye and being projected outward, and the other proceeding from the object and radiating outward. Democritus, however, concluded that vision takes place in or on the eye alone. Atoms bombarding an object (say, a cube) bounce off it again and form a pattern like that of the object itself. Some of these atoms then strike the eye of the perceiver, converging to a very narrow focus, entering the eye and finally appearing in the pupil. In other words, a picture of the object is reflected from the object itself to the eye, and what is seen is that reflection as it touches the eye. Cleve goes on to discuss more modern theories of vision and other forms of perception -but that is no longer the philosophy of Democritus, who anticipated in rather remarkable ways many of the general theories which modern science has adopted- although of course, he had no way of anticipating their detailed development./ Bailey, Cyril. The Greek Atomists and Epicurus. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928. - Cyril Bailey´s study of the Greek atomists concentrates on the philosophies of Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus. Bailey was led to an examination of the ideas of the former two philosophers as a preparation for an account of what he calls the "comprehensive system" of Epicurus./ In a brief biographical account of Democritus Bailey agrees with most of the authorities in presuming Democritus to have been a student of Leucippus and in thinking it unlikely that he studied with Anaxagoras or the Pythagoreans. The nickname "Wisdom" (sophia) was given to Democritus, Bailey remarks, because of the philosopher´s "universal knowledge." (The more familiar title, "The Laughing Philosopher," called attention to Democritus´ "good-natured amusement at ´the vain efforts´ of men...") / Bailey provides an account of the works attributed to Democritus and emphasizes the wide range of the philosopher´s interests: ethics, physics (including works on the physical universe, man, the mind, and sensation), logic, mathematics, astronomy, geography, music, literary criticism, the philosophy of language, medicine, agriculture, and a study of "history" or investigation. The most important part of this encyclopedic effort, according to Bailey, is Democritus´ atomic theory, learned from Leucippus but related to the other areas of human knowledge so as to allow him to "see it in truer proportion" and attach to the atomic theory a moral theory that, as Bailey writes, "contained the germs of a cheerful and good-hearted philosophy of imperturbability..." Bailey puts major emphasis on Democritus´ atomic theory, his discussion of the soul, sensation, and thought, and the ethics. He also discusses Democritus´ views concerning the cosmic whirl, the gods, and theory of knowledge./ The central presupossition of Democritus´ atomic theory, as derived from Leucippus, is that "ultimate existence" consits of "infinite indivisible particles in an infinite void." To this basic idea Democritus added the principle that "nothing is created out of the non-existent or is destroyed into the non-existent." Bailey points out that this principle provides the foundation for the atomistic account of the physical universe. Two more important principles were contributed by Democritus to the elaboration of the basic atomistic view: the principle that the universe is infinite because it was not created and the principle that "by necessity are foreordained all things that were and are and are to come." This latter principle, the principle of causal necessity, involves a strict causal determinism. Hence, Democritus was prepared to argue against the popular philosphical view that presented chance as a feature of physical reality and also against various metaphysical and religious views that posited "mysterious, semi-religious" forces. Bailey repreatedly describes Democritus as a thinker who held faithfully to the basic atomistic ideas he inherited but who, s a "man of the world," continually added to and modified the ideas so as to make them coherent and illuminating./ In agreement with Leucippus, Democritus argued for the permanence of individual atoms, but he departed from the line of proof advanced by Leucippus which based the proof of indestructability of the atoms on their extreme smallness. Demovritus relied in his proof of indestructability on the hardness of the atoms and, indeed, rebelled against the emphasis on smallness even to the point of insisting that some atoms are "very large" and that (as reported by one authority) "there might be an atom as big as the world." / As for the problem of accounting for the motio of atoms, Democritus did not, like Epicurus, posit a universal downward fall, nor maintain, as some atomists did, that motion results from the heaviness of the atoms or form some blow (although heaviness afects the character and direction of movement); instead, Democritus argued that motion is eternal, that there was no beginning of motion, and hence that there is no need to look for a primary efficient cause./ Bailey emphasizes Democritus´ contributions to the discussion of the differences of atomic shapes and their effect on the compoinding or union of the atoms./ Bailey points out that Democritus agreed with Leucippus in regarding the soul as corporeal and as being of the nature of fire (hence, composed of spherical atoms, the most mobile kind). Democritus accounted for the motion of the body by presupposing the causal effectiveness of soul atoms in motion: the moving soul actually made the body move. Death results when in the course of breathing the soul atoms are expired: the body, no longer able to sense or move, is then without life. The soul atoms disperse upon being breathed out; hence, the soul dies as does the body. Democritus conceived of mind as made up of the same kin of spherical atoms that make up the soul; but although the soul is distributed in the body and makes sensation and movement possible, the mind atoms are concentrated in the breast and produce the kind of sensation that is called thought./ According to Bailey, the word that is crucial to Democritus´ moral ideas is the term "cheerfulnesss." By "cheerfulness" is not meant pleasure, Bailey argues, for Democritus maintained that the "good and true" is the same for all persons but that the pleasant" varies from one to another; "cheerfulness" refers to the state of mind that is best for human beings as human, a state of imperturbabiity, of "undisturbed serenity." The emphasis is on the state of mind, not on physical pleasure, a state of the body. Hence, although in some ways Democritus´ ethics anticipates that of Epicurus, in other ways Democritus´view are significantly different. Throughout his ethics Democritus emphasized the superiority of the soul over the body, and he urged that human beings seek not "every pleasure but tthat which is concerned with the beautiful." (The "beautiful" is understood by reference to the soul´s preferences.) The body of Democritus´ ethics was accordingly directed toward the consideration of pracitcal ways of achieving cheerfulness, and it emphasized the virtues of moderation, friendship, and generosity, as well as other "positive" virtues that were extolled as providing aids to the cheerfulness of the mind./ Bailey concludes that in many ways Democritus´ mind was superior to that of Epicurus and that, "in not a few respects," with Democritus "Atomism as such reached its highest develpment in Greece." / EUTHYPRO: Author: Plato (427-347 B.C.) Type of work: Ethics, philosophy of religion. First transcribed: Probably one of the early dialogues Principal Ideas Advanced: a) Socrates has been charged by Meletus with corrupting the yourth of Athens and with inventing new gods; and he seeks to learn from Euthypro, who is prosecuting his own father for murder, the distinction between piety an impiety. b) Euthypro suggests that piety is prosecuting the unjust, those who have commited such crimes as murder or sacrilege; impiety is failure to prosecute such persons. c) But Socrates points out that this is an example, ot a definitio; and thus Euthypro suggests that piety is whatever is pleasing to the gods, and impiety is whatever is displeasing to them. d) But Socrates rejects Euthyphro´s definition on the ground that the gods do not agree in attitude concerning the acts of men, nor is it satisfactory to say that the pious is what all the gods love, for the pertinent question concerns the nature of piety in virtue of which the gods love it. e) If, as Euthphro then claims, piety is paying careful attention to the gods, by means of prayer and worship, for the benefit of man, then piety seems to be loved by the gods even though it is of no benefit to the gods; but this runs counter to the previous claim that piety is good not simply because the gods love it./ The Euthyphro deals with some of the events culminating in Socrates´ trial and death, portraying Socrates just before his trial. The Euthyphro forms a sequence with the dialogues, the Apology (dealing with the tiral) the Crito (dealing with Socrates´ incarnation after his conviction), and the Phaedo (dealing with the execution of Socrates by the drinking of the poison hemlock). / The Euthyphro is one of the best examples of the Socratic method. Socates is portrayed as seeking wisdom about the meaning of the terms "piety" and "impiety" so that he can defend himself against the charge of being impious. Euthyphro, presumably, knows what these terms mean, Socrates tries to learn from him by asking questions and by asking him to define the terms. Each answer given by Euthyphro is scrutinized by Socrates and found to be faulty. Euthyphro complains that Socrates will not let his statements "stand still." Instead, by hi persistent questioning, he makes the statements "move away," until Euthyphro no longer knows what to say. He finally quits the discussion, refusing to recognize his own ignorance concerning the matter in question, and refusing to see how dangerous it is for him, or for anyone else, to acto on the basis of such complete ignorance./ The discussion begins when Socrates and Euthyphro meet at the Porch of the King ARchon, here cases dealing with crimes affecting the state religion are judged. Euthyphroexpreses surprise at encountering Socrates in such a place. The latter explains that he is there because he has charged with corrupting the youth of Athens, and with inventing new gods while not believing in the olf, official ones. In contrast, Euthyphro has come to court to charge his own fathe with murder. Socrates suggests that Euthyphro must be very wise if he knows that he is right in prosecuting his own father. Such wisdom about what is right and wrong can be of great assistance to Sócrates in hiw own case, so he requests detail from Ehuthphro./ The charge that Euthyphro is bringing against his own father is based on a very strange story. A drunken laborer, who worked on the family farm, killed one of the slaves. Euthyphro´s father caught th murderer, tied him up, and threw him into a ditch. The father then sent a messager to Athens to find out what to do. While waiting for an answer, he completely neglected the bound murderer, who died from cold and hunger before the messenger returned. Euthyphro´s family insisted that the father did not actually kill the laborer, and even if he had, the laborer was a murderer anyway, so he probably deserved death. Also, they maintained, Eughyphto should not get involved, because it is impious for a son to charge his own father with murder. Euthypro, on the other hand, insisted that he was doing the right thing./ Socrates is so impressed by Euthyphro´s assurance that what he is doing is right and pious, that he asks Euthyphro to instruct him so that he will be able to go to his own trial and explain to his accusers and his judges what is right and wrong. Since piety and impiety must have the same characteristics in all actions that are pious or impious, Socrates asks Euthyphro to explain the distinction between piety and impiety./ The first definition that Euthyphro offers is that piety consists of doing what he is doing, namely, prosecuting an unjust personwho has comitted a serious crime, even if such a person is a parent. Impiety, on the other hand, consits of not prosecuting such an individual. Tu justify what he is doing, Euthyphro also points out that the Greek god, Zeus, bound up hos own father, Cronos, for commiting the crime of devouring some of his children, and that Cronos also punished his father for wrongdoing./ Socrates points out that Euthyphro´s statement does not actually constitute a definition of "piety," but only an illustration of one pious action. Such a statement does not really help in ascertaining if other actions are pious or impious. What is needed, instead of an example, is a statement of the essential characteristic of piety that makes all pious actions pious. Such a statement would allow one to classify all actions, since it would provide a general standard by which to judge which actions are pious and which are not. (As Plato points out over and over again in his dialogues, one does not actually know a general concept like "piety," "justice," "courage," and so on, if one can oly cite examples of pious, just or courageous activity. One cannot even be sure that these are examples of what one thinks, unless one also knows the meaning of the concepts; hence, the general knowledge is crucial for identifying and comprehending the particular examples with which we are acquainted.) / Euthyphro sees that he has not given a satisfactory definition of the term "piety" by citing the example of his case against his father. So, he offers a more general statement about "piety," saying that "what is pleasing to the gods is pious, and what is not pleasing to them is impious." Socrates congratulates him for giving him the kind of answer he wanted. All that remains, he states, is to find out if this definicion is the true one. The truth will be ascertained by asking questions about the definition given./ Since Euthyphro accepts all the Greek mythological tales about quarrels and disagreements among the gods. Socrates asks him whether the gods disagree about matters of fact or matters of value. The latter, says Euthypro. Then, Socrates argues, they are disagreening about what pleases or displeases them. The same action is pleasing to some gods and displeasing to others, and hence, according to Euthypro´s second definition of "piety," that which is pleasing to the gods, the same action can be both pious and impious./ Euthyphro insists that this contradictory conclusion does not follow because the gods all agree on certain matters, such as that if one man unjustly kills another, he is to be punished. The gods may all agree, Socrates admits, about certain universal laws regarding punishment, but a disagreement still exists among both men and gos as to which cases fall under these laws. They disagree in their evaluations of various acts, some saying the acts that are just, some that they are unjust. Even if Euthyphro is sure in his own case that the gods agree that his father´s action was unjust and that Euthyphro´s action is just, it is still evident that Euthphro´s second definition of "piety" is inadequate. In view of the fact that the gods disagree about some of the actions that are pleasing or displeasing to them, an action cannot be pious simply because it pleases some gods, since the same action would have to be classed as "impious" if it displeased other gods./ A third definition is presented to overcome the problem of divine disagrements. Something is pious if all the gods love it, and it is impious if they all have it. In cases where there is disagreement among the gods, the item in question is to be classed as neither pious nor impious./ Socrates immediately begins examining this new definition by raising the most serious point that is brought up in the dialogue. He asks Euthyphro whether the gods love piety because it is pious, or whether it is pious because the gods love it. The question at issue is whether the basic characteristic that determines piety is the fact tha the gods love it, or whether piety has in itself some characteristic which acoounts for the fact that the gods love it. (In a more general form this question was debated in the Middle Ages, when philosophers asked whether, if something is good, it is so because God wills it or whether God wills it because it is good. Is goodness an independent velue, or is it dependent upon the divine will? It was pointed out that if the latter be true, the Ten Commandments are good and right only because God decreed them; if he had decreed the exact opposite, then the opposite would be good and right, if goodness is simply whatever God wills.) /Euthyphro holds that the gods love piety because it is pious. Socrates then shows him that he has not offered a definition, but only an effect of piety in pointing out that the gods love it. Since, according to Euthyphro, piety has certain characteristics that make it what it is, and since it is because of those characteristics that the gods love it, then he still has not given aan adequate definition of "piety." He still has not revealed what the essential characteristics are that make it what it is./ Then Socrates asks Euthyphro once more to tell him what Euthyphro claims to know -namely, what piety and impiety are. By this point in the discussion, Euthyphro is bewildered; he complains that whatever he says in answer to Socrates´ persistent questioning just gets up and moves away. His words and his ideas do not seem able to stay fixed and permanent. Socrates then offers to help by suggesting another way of approaching the problem./ He asks Euthyphro whether whaever is pious must also be just. When Euthyphro gives an affirmative answer, Socrates inquires whether piety is the same as justice, or whether piety is only part of what constitutes justice. The latter, he is told. In turn, Socrates demands to know what part of justice piety is. If he could find out, he tells Euthyphro, then he could go to his own trial and show his accusers that they should not prosecute him for impiety, since he would then know what piety is and would act accordingly./ In answering the question, Euthyphro offers another definition of "piety" and states that righteousness and piety are that part of justice dealing with the careful attention which should be paid to the gods. The remainig portion of justice deals with the careful attention that ought to be paid to men. Socrates requests a clarification of the meaning of the phrase, "careful attention." A clarification is needed, he points out, because in most cases where careful attention is paid to some object, like a horse or a person, the object is benefited or improved by the attention. Is this also true of the gods? Are they benefited or improved by piety? No. Therefore, it must be a different kind of attention that is involved./ To make his point clear, Euthyphro says that the kind of attention he has in mind is that which slaves a type of service to the gods. Every service aims at accomplishing something. A doctor´s service produces health; a shipwright´s service produces a ship. Bu what does piety, which now seems to be a service produce? Generally speaking, Euthyphro answers, the principal result achieved through piety, by means of words and actions in prayer and sacrifice that are acceptable to the gods, is the preservation of the state and of private families. The results of impiety are the undermining and destruction of everything./ In terms of this latest answer, Socrates again asks what piety and impiety are. Euthyphro now seems to be offering the view that piety is a science of prayer and sacrifice, a cience that deals with asking of the gods and giving to them. Euthyphro insists this is exactly what he means, so Socrates proceeds to explore this latest definition of piety. To ask rightly of the gods and giving to them. Euthyphro insists this is exactly what he means, so Socrates proceeds to explore this latest definition of piety. To ask rightly of the gods is to ask of them what we need from them, and to give rightly to the gods is to give to them what they need from us. When Euthphro agrees to this view Scorates points out that piety is the art of carrying on business between the gods and men. But it is a strange kind of business, since one side, man´s, appears to receive all of the benefits. We are obviously benefited by what the gods gyve us. But what do we give in return? Also, are the gods benefited by it? / Euthyphro answers that we give in return are honor and praise, which are gifts acceptable to the gods. Then, Socrates argues, piety is acceptable to the gods, but it does not benefit them, nor is it loved by them, Euthyphro disagrees and insists that nothing is more loved by the gods than piety. So, Socrates asserts, piety means that which is loved by gods, Euthyphro agrees wholeheartedly./ Socrates then goes on to show Euthyphro that he has simply been talking around in a circle, and it is his won fault tht his words will not stay put. They had agreed earlier in the discussion that the gods love piety because it is pious, and it is not pious because the gods love it. The fact that the gods love it is an effect of its nature and not its essential characteristic. Hence, there must be something which constitutes the fundamental characteristic of piety, that makes it what it is and causes the gods to love it. Either this conclusion is wrong, or Euthyphro has yet to answer the question, "What is piety?" Then Socrates beggins all over again by asking that question./ Socrates points out once more that Euthphro must know the answer in order to pursue his case against his father. Surely, he would not risk doing the wrong thing and offending the gods, Euthphro wearily protests that he has no more time for the discussion, and he must rush off about his business. Socrates protests that he is left without the help he needs for his trial so that he can report that he knows what piety is, and hence will no commit any impieties in the future. At this point the dialogue ends./ The Euthyphro is one of the several superb short early dialogues that portray Socrates exposing the ignorance of supposedly wise men. When pressed, they are shown not to know what they are talking about. They cannot define basic concepts they deal with, such as "piety," "justice," and "courage," yet they are sure that what they are doing is pious, or just, or courageous. They are unwilling to undertake the difficult task of seeking to discover the meanings and natures of these terms. Their actions, based on their ignorance, can be disastrous, as is illustrated by both Euthyphro´s charges against his father and the impending trial of Socrates./ Pertinent Literature: Beckman, James. The Religious Dimension of Socrates Thought (The Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion.) Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Lauier University Press, 1979. The Euthyphro has to do with religion in two ways. In the first place, the dialogue is about religion. It takes place between Euthyphro and Socrates when they chance upon each other before King Archon´s office. They are both involved in legal cases, which have brought them there. Euthyphro is going to prosecute his father for murder, Socrates is to be indicted for apostasy and the corruption of yourth. These are all religious offenses. Socrates steers their talk about their impending trials to the basic questions involved in their respective cases, the question of what constitutes piety, and he does his best to keep their conversation on this topic./ In the second place, apart from the religious nature of their topic, Socrates´ engagement in the conversation is itself a religious act for him. It is a holy act of laying bare Euthyphro´s confusion and inconsistency on a topic of mutual importance. It is an act of subjecting to critical examination not just a professional statement or a theoretical posiion, but an entire personality, an entire way of life. The dialogue as a whole illustrates what Socrates in the Apology calls the sacred conduct of philosophy which he could not abandon without being impious. In short, the Euthyphro exhibits Socrates´ religous conception of philosophy at work.




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APOLOGY: Author: Plato (427-347 B.C.) Type of work: Ethics. First transcribed: Probably one of the early dialogues Principal Ideas Advanced: a) The oracle at Delphi declared Socrates to be the wisest of all men, and Socrates suggested that if he were superior to other men in wiscom, it was only because he was aware of his own ignorance. b) Defending himself against the charge of impiety and corrupting the young. Socrates argued that the pretenders to wisdom, whom he exposed by his critical questions, must have spread rumors about him in order to discredit him. c) Socrates maintained that it would have been foolish for him to corrupt the very persons with whom he associated, for everyone knows that corrupt and evil persons harm even those who have once befriended them. d) If to point out the weaknesses in a state is to do the state a service, Socrates argued, the he had better be rewarded for performing the function of gadfly to the state. e) Afte having been condemned to death, Socrates declared the death is not to be feared, for either it is annhilation, or it is a change to a better world where one might converse with noble souls.












Oigo tu voz
la voz del tiempo
la voz de todos
de nadie
de lo que fue
de lo que nunca será
voz de la esperanza
sinónimo de la búsqueda
de la justificación
del porqué vivir.

Nada existe,
todo está en tránsito
el cambio pervive
en el todo
el cambio
es Dios.
el pervive
es su Providencia.


Que afinidad puede haber
entre un viejo negro
y un andaluz?
El arte y la tragedia
del talento.
La capacidad inexcusable,
envidiable?
de traducir la tristeza
el ser, el vivir,
que es sinónimo
de necesidad
en armonía.
Mujer
ser misterioso
todo
hasta tu existencia
subordinado
a tu necia
obsecada
repetitiva
intención de procreación.



Una casa es el lugar donde puedes sacar los gases con confianza.

La gente no desaparece
nosotros dejamos de verlos
no muere
somos incapaces
de presenciar
su nuevo ser
life is in the eye
of the beholder.
Los muertos no se van,
permanecen,
nuestra percepción obscura
no registra
su presencia
porque están
del lado luminoso
de la Razón.